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Transmission Game in MIMO Interference
Channels With Radio-Frequency Energy Harvesting
Liang Dong, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—For multi-user transmissions over MIMO inter-
ference channels, each user designs the transmit covariance
matrix to maximize its information rate. When passive radio-
frequency (RF) energy harvesters are present in the network, the
transmissions are constrained by both the transmit power limits
and the energy harvesting requirements. A passive RF energy
harvester collects the radiated energy from nearby wireless infor-
mation transmitters instead of using a dedicated wireless power
source. It needs multiple transmitters to concentrate their RF
radiation on it because typical electric field strengths are weak.
In this paper, strategic games are proposed for the multi-user
transmissions. First, in a non-cooperative game, each transmitter
has a best-response strategy for the transmit covariance matrix
that follows a multi-level water-filling solution. A pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium exists. Secondly, in a cooperative game, there
is no need to estimate the proportion of the harvested energy
from each transmitter. Rather, the transmitters bargain over the
unit-reward of the energy contribution. An approximation of the
information rate is used in constructing the individual utility
such that the problem of network utility maximization can be
decomposed and the bargaining process can be implemented
distributively. The bargaining solution gives a point of rates
that is superior to the Nash equilibria and close to the Pareto
front. Simulation results verify the algorithms that provide good
communication performance while satisfying the RF energy-
harvesting requirements.
Index Terms—Multi-user MIMO communications, interference
channel, RF energy harvesting, convex optimization, cooperative
game, Pareto efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
Energy harvesting delivers the necessary energy to operate
the untethered IoT devices and alleviate the complete depen-
dence on batteries [1]–[5]. Energy harvesting transducers can
harvest energy from ambient sources and convert it to use-
ful electrical energy. Radio-frequency (RF) inductive devices
convert electromagnetic energy to electrical energy. RF energy
source is relatively omnipresent compared with solar, thermal,
and vibration energy sources. RF energy harvesting can be
used in tandem with other energy harvesting technologies. For
example, the scavenged RF energy can prevent a solar-charged
battery from discharging at night [6]. The harvester output can
be in the forms of direct power or stored energy that charges
super-capacitors or lithium ion batteries. In particular, passive
RF energy harvesting is promising that it exploits ambient RF
sources instead of intentional high-power RF sources [7]–[9].
However, RF energy harvesting has a drawback. Typical
electric field strengths are weak (unless located close to
sources), which severely limits the quantity of energy that can
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be harvested. The passive RF energy harvesting of today’s
technology can only generate energy approximately an order
of magnitude less than indoor solar and thermoelectric de-
vices. To overcome this, we will coordinate multiple wireless
transmissions of nearby communication systems and purposely
concentrate the RF radiation at the energy harvesters. Instead
of working on the energy harvester side, we develop trans-
mission techniques on the wireless information systems side
to simplify the design of the IoT devices.
In wireless communications, multi-user transmissions in in-
terference channels imply competition and cooperation. If the
transmissions are over multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)
channels, each user designs its signal transmit covariance
matrix to maximize the information rate while inevitably
generating inference to others. When there are RF energy
harvesters in the network, the multi-user transmission problem
needs to take into account both the communication constraints
and the energy-harvesting requirements. As multiple antennas
are used at the communication transceivers, the energy is
beamformed to the harvesters. Coordinating multiple wireless
transmitters for RF concentration is less demanding than
interference management among the wireless communication
systems. We just need to “accumulate” the interference power
at the energy harvesters.
Simultaneous wireless information and energy transfer has
attracted significant attention recently [10]–[13]. The funda-
mental performance limits and the optimal transmission strate-
gies have been studied in various communication scenarios
such as the downlink of a cellular system [14], the cooperative
relay system [15], and the broadcasting system [16], [17].
Also, several transmission strategies and power allocation
methods have been proposed for multi-user multiple-input
single-output (MISO) scenario [18], [19]. For a MIMO wire-
less broadcast system where one receiver harvests energy and
other receivers decode information, transmission strategy is
designed for maximal information rate versus energy trans-
fer [16]. With multiple single-antenna transmitters that send
independent messages to their respective receivers, collab-
orative energy beamforming is required for wireless power
transfer [20]. Furthermore, there have been several studies of
joint wireless information and energy transfer in interference
channels [21]–[26]. Because the interference has different
impacts on the performances of information processing and
energy harvesting at the receivers, the transmission strategy
is a critical issue. In a K-user MIMO interference channel,
the transmitters transferring energy exploit a rank-one energy
beamforming, and an iterative algorithm can be used to
optimize the transmit covariance matrices [25]. In another
2K-user MIMO scenario, the total transmit power of the
users is minimized by jointly designing transmit beamformers,
power splitters, and receive filters [27]. When a multi-antenna
transmitter communicates with its information receiver, it can
intentionally focus the transmitted power to the nearby RF
energy harvesters with a guarantee on its information rate [28].
In this paper, a multi-user transmission problem is con-
sidered in MIMO interference channels with RF energy har-
vesting requirements. Each transmitter can estimate its user
channel and measure the combined interference and noise.
However, the signaling between different users is very limited
so that collaborative beamforming or joint design of trans-
mit beamformers is not possible. Instead, the transmitters
compete by designing signal transmit covariance matrices
to increase own information rates, subject to the transmit
power constraints and the energy harvesting requirements.
Each transmitter knows the channel to the energy harvesters,
however, it does not know the channels from other transmitters
to the energy harvesters.
The multi-user transmission problem is formulated as a
strategic game. In a non-cooperative game, with a measure-
ment of the combined interference and noise, the best response
of a transmitter is to design the transmit covariance matrix
according to the multi-level water-filling solution. A pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium exists. However, it may not be
unique or Pareto-efficient. The best-response dynamic may
cycle and not converge to a Nash equilibrium. In a coop-
erative game, the sum information rate is maximized, and
the optimal point of rates can be found that approaches the
Pareto front [29], [30]. There is no need to estimate the
proportion of the harvested energy from each transmitter.
Rather, the transmitters bargain over the unit-reward of the
energy contribution to the harvesters. The individual utility
function of the game is constructed from an approximation of
the information rate such that the problem of network utility
maximization can be decomposed and the bargaining process
implemented distributively. With moderate signaling among
the users, the bargaining process quickly generates a point of
rates that is close to the Pareto front.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, a system model is provided for the multi-user
MIMO communications, and the rate maximization problem
is formulated with the RF energy harvesting requirement.
In Section III, a non-cooperative game is proposed for the
multi-user transmissions over interference channels. The best-
response strategy is based on a multi-level water-filling solu-
tion. In Section IV, a cooperative game is proposed for the
multi-user transmissions. The transmitters bargain over the
unit-reward of the energy contribution while maximizing the
network information rate. In Section V, simulation results ver-
ify the transmission algorithms and show that the distributed
bargaining offers superior performance. Finally, conclusions
are drawn in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In the vicinity of the passive RF energy harvester, there are
K pairs of wireless communication transmitter and receiver
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Fig. 1. K pairs of wireless communication transmitter and receiver as well
as an energy receiver.
that share the same radio channel resources of time and fre-
quency (Figure 1). Each transmitter hasMt antennas and each
receiver hasMr antennas. The passive RF energy harvester has
a single antenna through which it can harvest the energy for the
attached IoT device or transmit through backscattering [31]. In
Sections II through IV-C, we develop the wireless transmission
technique considering only one RF energy harvester. The
transmission methods will be extended to the scenario of
multiple RF energy harvesters in Section IV-D.
Suppose that the wireless transmissions of the communica-
tion systems are narrowband over quasi-static fading channels.
In the baseband equivalent model, the signal transmitted at
transmitter i is xi ∈ CMt , i ∈ K = {1, 2, . . . ,K}. The signal
received at receiver i is yi ∈ CMr , i ∈ K, which is given by
yi = Hiixi +
∑
j∈K\{i}
Hijxj + zi (1)
where Hii ∈ C
Mr×Mt is the normalized user channel from
transmitter i to its intended receiver, Hij ∈ CMr×Mt is the
normalized interference channel from transmitter j to receiver
i, and zi ∈ CMr×1 is a zero-mean circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian noise vector with zi ∼ CN (0, σ2nI). It is
assumed that zi contains both noise and possible interference
generated by the backscatter device. In this paper, without loss
of generality, it is assumed that σ2n = 1 for clarity.
The energy harvester (or the RF back scatterer) does not
need to convert the received signal from the RF band to the
baseband. Nevertheless, the RF power is proportional to the
power of the baseband signal. Therefore, we use the baseband
equivalent model to reveal the RF energy harvesting effects as
well. The baseband received signal at the energy harvester is
given by
u =
∑
i∈K
gHi xi + n (2)
where gi ∈ CMt×1 is the conjugate channel vector from
transmitter i to the energy harvester, and n is the background
noise.
3Let Qi denote the covariance matrix of signal xi, i.e.,
Qi = E[xix
H
i ]. It is assumed that the Gaussian codebook
with infinitely many codewords is used for the symbols and
the expectation is taken over the entire codebook. Therefore,
xi is zero-mean circularly symmetric complex Gaussian with
xi ∼ CN (0,Qi). The covariance matrix is Hermitian positive
semidefinite that is denoted as Qi  0. The transmit power
at transmitter i is limited by its power constraint Pi, i.e.,
Tr(Qi) ≤ Pi. Let Q−i denote the collection of the transmit
covariance matrices of the (K − 1) transmitters other than
transmitter i. From an information-theoretical perspective [32],
[33], the maximum information rate of transmitter-receiver
pair i is given by
ri(Qi,Q−i) = log
∣∣I+R−1i HiiQiHHii ∣∣ (3)
where Ri is the multi-user interference and noise as
Ri =
∑
j∈K\{i}
HijQjH
H
ij + I. (4)
The received power at the RF energy harvester is the
harvested energy normalized by the baseband symbol period.
It can be written as
ζE[|u|2] = ζ
∑
i∈K
gHi Qigi (5)
where ζ is a constant that indicates energy conversion effi-
ciency. It is implied in (5) that, at the energy harvester, the
noise power is negligible compared with the received signal
power. This makes sense because we do not consider any
energy that can be harvested from noise.
For each communication receiver, the signals transmitted
from other transmitters become the interference. The received
signals from other transmitters should be minimized. In con-
trast, for the energy harvester, all of the transmitters are energy
contributors. The combined received signal power should be
maximized. At transmitter i, i ∈ K, the design objective for the
transmit covariance matrix Qi is to maximize the achievable
information rate while satisfying the individual transmit power
constraint and the overall energy harvesting requirement. The
optimization problem can be formulated as (∀i ∈ K)
P1 :
maximize
Qi
ri(Qi,Q−i)
subject to Qi  0
Tr(Qi) ≤ Pi∑
k∈K g
H
k Qkgk ≥ Γ
(6)
where Γ indicates the energy harvesting requirement such
that ζΓ is the minimum required harvested energy during a
symbol period. Because of the objective function and the last
constraint of Problem P1, the design of transmit covariance
matrix Qi is coupled with those of other transmitters.
III. WIRELESS TRANSMISSIONS IN A NON-COOPERATIVE
GAME
A. Non-cooperative Game
Of theK wireless communication users in the network, each
user designs the transmit signal by regulating its covariance
matrix to boost the maximum information rate. Each user’s
transmission is within the transmit power limit and the overall
radiated energy reaching the RF energy harvester should meet
the energy harvesting requirement. For each transmitter, modi-
fying the transmit covariance matrix affects the interference to
other receivers hence changing the maximum information rates
of other users. It is a competition among the wireless users;
each tends its own maximum information rate. Therefore,
the problem of simultaneous wireless transmissions can be
formulated as a strategic game [34], which is denoted as
a : 〈K, {Si}i∈K, {ui}i∈K〉 (7)
where K is the finite set of the K transmitters as the game
players, Si (i ∈ K) is the set of strategies available to player
i. The overall strategy set of all the players is S = ×i∈KSi.
The utility function of player i (i ∈ K) is ui : S → R. The
transmit covariance matrix Qi is the game strategy of player
i, i.e., Qi ∈ Si. In this paper, we address the general case in
which each transmitter can freely adjust its transmit covariance
matrix. For some special cases with space-time coding or
confined transmission, other strategies may be adopted. For
example, if the transmission is confined to the eigenmodes
of the channel matrix, each transmitter can adopt the power
allocation on the channel eigenmodes as the game strategy.
The maximum information rate of player i is used as its utility
function, i.e., ui = ri(Qi,Q−i).
With all competition but no cooperation among the players,
this strategic game is a non-cooperative game. A steady state
of the non-cooperative game is the Nash equilibrium (NE),
where no player can improve his utility by unilaterally chang-
ing his own strategy. In Game a, the NE can be expressed
as
ri(Q
∗
i ,Q
∗
−i) ≥ ri(Qi,Q
∗
−i), ∀i ∈ K (8)
whereQ∗i is the transmit covariance matrix for user i at the NE
and Q∗−i is the collection of the transmit covariance matrices
of all of the other users except user i at the NE.
When Q−i is fixed in Problem P1, the objective function
is concave and the constraints are convex in the space of
positive semidefinite matrices. Therefore, Problem P1 is a
convex optimization problem for which efficient numerical
optimization is possible [35]. In Game a, every strategy set Si
is compact and convex, the utility function ui = ri(Qi,Q−i)
is a continuous function in the profile of strategies Q ∈ S
and concave in Qi. Therefore, the game has at least one
pure-strategy NE [36], [37]. The NE is a strategy profile for
which each player’s strategy is a best response to the other
players’ strategies. Given Q−i, transmitter i optimizes the
transmit covariance matrix Qi as its best response by solving
the following optimization problem
maximize
Qi
log
∣∣I+R−1i HiiQiHHii ∣∣
subject to Qi  0
Tr(Qi) ≤ Pi
gHi Qigi ≥ Γ−
∑
k∈K\{i} g
H
k Qkgk = Γi
(9)
where Γi is a portion of the energy harvesting requirement
imposed on transmitter i. It can be acquired, for example, by
4shutting off user i’s transmission alone. Suppose that the RF
energy harvester can measure the harvested power (or energy
over a symbol period) and feed it back to the transmitters
through the Internet. As the energy harvester is attached to
an IoT device, this is feasible. Transmitter i turns on and off
its transmission and observes the difference of the harvested
energy from the feedback. If there is mechanism to ensure that
it is unlikely that multiple transmitters shut off at the same
time, transmitter i can estimate the minimum energy that it
should contribute to the RF energy harvester.
B. Local Optimization Problem
Transmitter i can estimate its user channel Hii through
pilot signals and feedback, and it can measure the multi-
user interference and noise Ri without the need to acquire
individual Qj or Hij , j 6= i. The objective function of the
optimization problem (9) is
log
∣∣I+R−1i HiiQiHHii ∣∣ = log ∣∣∣I+ HˆiiQiHˆHii ∣∣∣ (10)
where Hˆii = R
−1/2
i Hii. A singular value decomposition on
Hˆii gives Hˆii = UiΣiV
H
i . With Qˆi = V
H
i QiVi and gˆi =
VHi gi, the optimization problem can be written as
maximize
Qˆi
log
∣∣∣I+ΣiQˆiΣHi ∣∣∣
subject to Qˆi  0
Tr(Qˆi) ≤ Pi
gˆHi Qˆigˆi ≥ Γi.
(11)
The Hadamard’s inequality states that the determinant of a
positive definite matrix is less than or equal to the product
of its diagonal entries. Equality in Hadamard’s inequality
is achieved if and only if the positive definite matrix is
diagonal. Therefore, the optimal Qˆi of (11) has to be diagonal.
With a diagonal matrix Qˆi, the optimization problem (11) is
equivalently
P2 :
maximize
{qˆim}
∑Mt
m=1 log
(
1 + |σim|2qˆim
)
subject to qˆim ≥ 0, ∀m∑Mt
m=1 qˆim ≤ Pi∑Mt
m=1 |gˆim|
2qˆim ≥ Γi
(12)
where {qˆim} are the diagonal elements of Qˆi, {σim} are the
diagonal elements of Σi, and {gˆim} are the elements of gˆi.
Problem P2 is local to transmitter i. In the following, we
remove index i as we understand it is a response of player
i, i.e., transmitter i.
If maxm(|gˆm|2) < Γ/P , Problem P2 has no feasible
solution. Otherwise, it can be solved, and the optimal {qˆm}
are given by a multi-level water-filing solution as
qˆ∗m = max
{
0,
1
ν1 − ν2|gˆm|2
−
1
|σm|2
}
(13)
where ν1 and ν2 are the parameters that make {qˆ∗m} satisfy
the transmit power constraint and the energy harvesting re-
quirement. The proof of (13) is given in Appendix A.
The multi-level water-filling solution has the following
properties. (1) For a particular m that 0 < ν1 − ν2|gˆm|
2 <
|σm|2, the water level is 1/(ν1 − ν2|gˆm|2). The water level
increases when the transmit power limit P increases. (2) For
larger |gˆm|2, the mth water level 1/(ν1 − ν2|gˆm|2) is higher,
given that 0 < ν1−ν2|gˆm|2 < |σm|2. (3) If
∑Mt
m=1 |gˆm|
2qˆm >
Γ, then ν2 = 0. This reverts to the conventional optimization
problem with the single-level water-filling solution. With this
solution of {qˆm}, the energy harvesting requirement is already
satisfied.
For a relatively large Γ, as long as Γ ≤ maxm(|gˆm|2)P ,
there is a feasible multi-level water-filling solution with posi-
tive ν1 and ν2. As ν1 > 0 and ν2 > 0, both the transmit power
constraint and the energy harvesting constraint attain equality.
Suppose M is the set that contains the spatial directions in
which the transmitter transmits, i.e., qˆm > 0, ∀m ∈ M. For a
feasible solution,M is not an empty set. Using (13), we have∑
m∈M
1
ν1 − ν2|gˆm|2
= P +
∑
m∈M
1
|σm|2
= P ′ (14)
∑
m∈M
|gˆm|2
ν1 − ν2|gˆm|2
= Γ+
∑
m∈M
|gˆm|2
|σm|2
= Γ′ (15)
It follows that
ν1P
′ − ν2Γ
′ = |M| (16)
where |M| is the cardinality of setM. Replacing ν1, we have∑
m∈M
1
|M|+ ν2αm
= 1 (17)
where αm = Γ
′− |gˆm|2P ′. Therefore, ν2 is a positive root of
∏
m
(|M|+ ν2αm)−
|M|∑
k=1
∏
m 6=k
(|M|+ ν2αm).
For example, if |M| = 2, ν2 = −
∑
m(1/αm).
If |M| = 3, ν2 = −
∑
m(1/αm) +(∑
m(1/α
2
m)−
∑
m αm/
∏
m αm
)1/2
.
When |M| ≥ 4, ν2 can be found using numerical methods.
The multi-level water-filling solution (13) of Problem P2
can be calculated as in Algorithm 1. Once the optimal
{qˆ∗m} are found, the optimal Qˆ
∗
i is constructed as Qˆ
∗
i =
diag{qˆ∗1 , qˆ
∗
2 , . . . , qˆ
∗
Mt
}, and the optimal transmit covariance
matrix for user i is Q∗i = ViQˆ
∗
iV
H
i .
C. Game Implementation and Best-Response Dynamics
How do the K wireless transmitters play the non-
cooperative game? First, transmitter i (i ∈ K) estimates
its user channel Hii and the vector channel gi to the RF
energy harvester. (Appendix B gives a discussion on estimating
channel gi.) Secondly, transmitter i measures the multi-user
interference and noise Ri. If transmitter i senses that other
transmitters have fixed their transmissions, it reasons that it
is its turn to update the transmit covariance matrix. Thirdly,
transmitter i turns off the transmission and acquires the feed-
back from the RF energy harvester about the partial minimum
energy requirement Γi. Finally, transmitter i solves local
Problem P2 with the optimal transmit covariance matrix Q∗i .
5Algorithm 1 Multi-level Water-filling Algorithm
0. If maxm(|gˆm|2) < Γ/P , there is no feasible solution for
{qˆm}, Stop.
1. Suppose ν2 = 0, find optimal {qˆm} as the conventional
single-level water-filling solution with transmit power con-
straint P ;
2. With these calculated {qˆm}, if energy harvesting require-
ment Γ is satisfied, Exit. Otherwise, ν1 > 0 and ν2 > 0.
Both the transmit power constraint and the energy harvest-
ing constraint attain equality;
3. Set a full set M with all the transmit directions M =
{1, 2, . . . ,Mt};
4. Find ν2 using (17), and find ν1 using (16);
5. With ν1 and ν2, calculate {qˆm} using (13);
6. If qˆm > 0, ∀m ∈ M, Exit. Otherwise, if qˆk = 0, ∃k ∈ M,
exclude k from set M. Go to Step 4.
This is the best response of user i to other users’ transmissions
regarding maximum information rate.
As discussed before, Game a has at least one pure-strategy
NE. If player i, ∀i ∈ K, has a single best response to each
strategy profile Q−i of the other players, the K strategies at
the NE can be put in the collection of best-response equa-
tions. Unfortunately, each player’s best response can not be
expressed in a single equation. The NE can only be approached
by best-response iterations among the players. The network
iterations can be done with asynchronous player updates.
Without the energy harvesting requirement, a similar mul-
tiuser MIMO transmission game is addressed [38]. The water-
filling operator is interpreted as a projection onto a proper
polyhedral set. Then, a set of sufficient conditions are derived
that guarantee the uniqueness of the NE and the global
convergence of the distributed asynchronous water-filling al-
gorithms. The sufficient conditions are based on the user
channel {Hii}i∈K and the interference channels {Hij}i6=j .
In our problem, the uniqueness conditions would also depend
on the vector channels {gi}i∈K to the RF energy harvester. In
general, the NE may not be unique. Also, the best-response
dynamic may cycle in the game and not converge to a NE [39].
IV. WIRELESS TRANSMISSIONS IN A COOPERATIVE GAME
A. Cooperative Game
There are two practical concerns of the non-cooperative
game of user transmissions. First, the proportion of energy
contribution imposed on each transmitter may not be optimal.
User i uses the transmission on-and-off process and the energy
harvester feedback to estimate the partial minimum energy
requirement Γi. It gives little consideration to what is the
best distribution of energy contribution among the transmitters.
Furthermore, if other transmitters currently contribute little to
the RF energy harvester and the energy harvesting requirement
is harsh, user i may just give up transmission by not having
a feasible solution of its local optimization problem. Second,
even though there exists a pure NE of the non-cooperative
game, it may not be a globally optimal solution for the user
information rates. The NE point is not necessarily Pareto-
efficient and may not be desirable of the network. Therefore,
we do not further pursue the uniqueness condition of the NE
or the convergence condition of the non-cooperative game.
For multiple players in a strategic game, the optimal net-
work outcome depends on competition as well as cooperation.
Each player is an autonomous agent, but negotiation with
moderate signaling among the players is allowed. Transmitter
i of the game bargain over its share of energy contribution Γi
to the RF energy harvester while maximizing its information
rate ri. The goal of the cooperative game is to achieve the
user information rates that approach the Pareto optimal rates.
For Game a, the strategies of all the players {Qi} are inter-
twined to satisfy the energy harvesting requirement. Therefore,
the players need to cooperate with each other for a good distri-
bution of this requirement. As the transmitters bargain over the
assignments of the energy requirement, a bargaining problem
can be leveraged to analyze player cooperation [40]. Game a
can be regarded as a bargain among the K transmitters over
their shares of energy contribution to the RF energy harvester.
To be fair, the unit-reward of the harvested energy should be
the same regardless of which transmitter does the RF radiation
come from. In our cooperative game, we set the disagreement
point at zero. Therefore, any rational player tends to cooperate
with others [40].
Several network utility functions can be selected for the
cooperative game. As long as the network utility function is a
quasi-concave and strict increasing function of the individual
utilities, there is a unique bargaining solution. For example,
the product of the individual utilities can be chosen as the
network utility function. It is called the Nash product and
the bargaining solution is the Nash bargaining solution. In
our problem, instead of the Nash bargaining solution, we are
interested in finding the Utilitarian solution that maximizes
the sum of the individual utilities. The Utilitarian solution is a
Pareto-efficient solution. It is directly related to the maximum
sum rate of the network with some tradeoff in rate fairness
among the users.
For Game a, finding the Utilitarian solution that maximizes
the network utility can be formulated as the following opti-
mization problem.
P3 :
maximize
{Qi}i∈K
∑
i∈K ri(Qi,Q−i)
subject to Qi  0, ∀i ∈ K
Tr(Qi) ≤ Pi, ∀i ∈ K∑
i∈K g
H
i Qigi ≥ Γ.
(18)
In the cooperative game, the distribution of the energy harvest-
ing requirement is not pre-determined. The players adjust their
transmit strategies to maximize the network utility as well as
reach an agreement of allocating the energy contributions. In
general, maximizing the sum information rate is a non-convex
problem and is hard to solve.
B. Problem Decomposition
As the transmitters play the cooperative game, the strategy
of transmitter i (i ∈ K) is the transmit covariance matrix Qi.
6With Problem P3 on the maximization of the sum information
rate, the players can bargain over the last constraint, i.e.,
the energy harvesting requirement. A distributed algorithm
is desirable for implementing the bargaining process among
the players. The network utility is the sum information rate
which is not concave in {Qi}i∈K. Before we can decompose
the optimization problem into several subproblems for the
cooperative game, we need to modify the network utility so
that it is concave in {Qi}i∈K.
To facilitate the distributed bargaining among the players,
we reconstruct the individual utility function from an approx-
imation of the maximum information rate. The maximum
information rate ri can be approximated with a first-order
Taylor expansion around Ri = R˜i as
ri(Qi,Q−i) ≈ log
∣∣∣I+ R˜−1i HiiQiHHii ∣∣∣
−Tr
(
(R˜−1i − (R˜i +HiiQiH
H
ii )
−1)
(Ri − R˜i)
)
≈ log
∣∣∣I+ R˜−1i HiiQiHHii ∣∣∣− Tr(AiRi) + c
(19)
where Ai = R˜
−1
i − (R˜i+HiiQ˜iH
H
ii )
−1 and c = Tr(AiR˜i).
The derivation of the approximation in (19) is shown in
Appendix C. Notice that we replace Qi with Q˜i in Ai as
another approximation.
To achieve a good expansion neighborhood that reduces
the approximate error of the Taylor polynomial, R˜i can be
calculated as R˜i =
∑
j 6=iHijQ˜jH
H
ij + I, and Q˜i is the
solution of the following convex optimization problem
maximize
Qi
log
∣∣I+HiiQiHHii ∣∣
subject to Qi  0
Tr(Qi) ≤ Pi
gHi Qigi ≥
Γ
K .
(20)
Here, the energy harvesting requirement is evenly undertaken
by the K transmitters. This is assumed only to estimate a
point around which the maximum information rate is Taylor-
expanded. Later, the optimal transmissions are determined
with a deliberate distribution of the energy harvesting require-
ment among the K users.
Let us define the utility function of transmitter i (i ∈ K) as
ui(Qi) = log
∣∣∣I+ R˜−1i HiiQiHHii ∣∣∣−∑
j 6=i
Tr(AjHjiQiH
H
ji).
(21)
Comparing (21) with (19), we notice that the individual
utility function comes from the approximation of the maxi-
mum information rate. Moreover, the second terms in (19),
i.e., −Tr(Ai
∑
i6=jHijQjH
H
ij ), are interchanged among the
players and become the second terms in (21). The second
part of the utility function ui(Qi) can be regarded as the
penalty for player i due to the interference it causes to other
users. The utility function ui(Qi) only depends on transmit
covariance matrix Qi, and it is concave in Qi. Therefore,∑
i∈K ui(Qi) is concave in {Qi}i∈K. This makes it possible
for a distributed implementation of the cooperative game. The
cost of this method is that player i needs to know the cross-
channel matrices {Hji}j∈K\{i}. The interference channelHji
can be estimated and fed back to transmitter i through user
cooperation.
Problem P3 now becomes
P4 :
maximize
{Qi}i∈K
∑
i∈K ui(Qi)
subject to Qi  0, ∀i ∈ K
Tr(Qi) ≤ Pi, ∀i ∈ K∑
i∈K g
H
i Qigi ≥ Γ.
(22)
Problem P4 is a convex optimization problem with a coupling
constraint on the strategies {Qi}i∈K. We use the dual de-
composition method to decompose the Lagrangian dual prob-
lem [41], [42]. We decompose the problem into subproblems
for the players and develop a distributed algorithm to find the
bargaining solution of the cooperative game.
The Lagrangian of Problem P4 is given by
L({Qi}, λ) =
∑
i∈K
log
∣∣∣I+ R˜−1i HiiQiHHii ∣∣∣
−
∑
i∈K
∑
j 6=i
Tr
(
AjHjiQiH
H
ji
)
−λ
(
Γ−
∑
i∈K
gHi Qigi
)
(23)
with Qi  0 and Tr(Qi) ≤ Pi, ∀i ∈ K. λ is the dual variable
associated with the energy harvesting requirement. With the
dual decomposition method, the network utility maximization
problem can be divided into two levels of optimization prob-
lems. At the lower level, each player solves the local convex
optimization problem as
maximize
Qi
log
∣∣∣I+ R˜−1i HiiQiHHii ∣∣∣
−
∑
j 6=i Tr
(
AjHjiQiH
H
ji
)
+ λgHi Qigi
subject to Qi  0
Tr(Qi) ≤ Pi.
(24)
The energy contribution of transmitter i to the RF energy
harvester is denoted as βi = g
H
i Qigi. λ can be interpreted
as the unit-reward for energy contribution.
At the higher level, the master problem updates the dual
variable λ by solving the dual problem
minimize
λ
g(λ) =
∑
i∈K gi(λ)− λΓ
subject to λ ≥ 0
(25)
where gi(λ) is the dual function obtained as the maximum
value of the Lagrangian solved in (24) for a given λ. The
decomposition method solves the dual problem instead of the
primal problem. Since the original problem is convex and there
exist strictly feasible solutions, strong duality holds. At the
higher level, the unit-reward λ can be determined by the sub-
gradient method [42]. In Game a, we use the bisection method
to obtain λ.
7C. Distributed Bargaining
With the dual decomposition method at our disposal, we
can orchestrate the transmitters to play the cooperative game
with distributed bargaining. During the initialization phase,
first, transmitter i (i ∈ K) estimates its user channel Hii and
the vector channel gi to the RF energy harvester. Transmitter
i also estimates the cross-channel matrices {Hij}. Secondly,
transmitter i finds Q˜i as the solution of (20). It then calculates
R˜i and Ai. Alternatively, R˜i can be measured by letting
the transmitters transmit using {Q˜i}. Thirdly, the transmitters
broadcast {Ai} and cross-channels {Hij} to other transmitters
in the network.
After the initialization phase, the transmitters solve the
lower-level subproblems distributively. The transmitters set
initial values of λ
(0)
min and λ
(0)
max and calculate the unit-reward
of energy contribution as λ(0) = (λ
(0)
min + λ
(0)
max)/2. Given
the unit-reward λ(0), each transmitter determines its transmit
covariance matrixQi by solving the local convex optimization
problem (24). The subproblems are coordinated by the high-
level master problem through signaling. The energy contri-
bution βi = g
H
i Qigi is shared among the players. After
receiving {βi} from all of the players, each transmitter updates
the unit-reward of energy contribution with the bisection rule
as {
λ
(z+1)
min = λ
(z) if
∑
i∈K βi < Γ
λ
(z+1)
max = λ(z) if
∑
i∈K βi ≥ Γ
(26)
λ(z+1) =
1
2
(
λ
(z+1)
min + λ
(z+1)
max
)
(27)
where z = 0, 1, 2, . . . is the iteration index. For example,
if
∑
i∈K βi < Γ, which means that the energy harvesting
requirement is not met, the unit-reward λ will increase. This
gives an incentive for the transmitters to adjust their transmis-
sions for more contribution to the RF energy harvester. The
players have the same value λmin, the same value λmax, and
the same bisection rule. It guarantees that each transmitter
generates the same updated λ. The players may compare
their updated values of λ and reach a consensus if there is
any discrepancy due to signaling errors. Alternatively, one
representative player can update λ and broadcast the new value
to others. In this way, the transmitters effectively bargain over
the unit-reward λ, and it is fair to every player. With a new
λ, each transmitter determines its transmit covariance matrix
again. Solving the local optimization problem does not need
new information except for the updated unit-reward λ. Each
iteration of the algorithm can be regarded as a bargaining
round. After several rounds of bargaining, the algorithm stops
when the unit-reward λ converges. That is, a deal is made on
the unit-reward and how to distribute the energy contributions
among the transmitters.
The distributed bargaining process of the cooperative game
is summarized in Algorithm 2. Except for the steps in the
initialization phase, only scalar-valued energy contributions
{βi} are to be exchanged among the K users. Therefore, the
network signaling can be kept moderate.
Finally, we discuss how to overcome the approximation
error in (19). If Q˜i initially calculated from (20) is very
different from the optimal Qi, the error in the approximation
can be relatively large. This may lead to a sum rate that is
much less than the optimal sum rate. In this case, we can
update Q˜i with the bargaining solution Q
∗
i , i.e., Q˜i = Q
∗
i .
With updated {Q˜i}, {R˜i} and {Ai}, we repeat the entire
distributed bargain process. In a few iterations of updating Q˜i
and repeating the bargaining process, the algorithm provides
user achievable information rates that approach the Pareto
front.
Algorithm 2 Distributed Bargaining Process of Cooperative
Game
0. Initialization Phase: Each player estimates Hii, gi, and
{Hij}. Each player finds Q˜i as the solution of (20) and
calculates R˜i and Ai. The transmitters send {Ai} and
{Hij} to other players;
1. The players set λ
(0)
min and λ
(0)
max. z = 0;
2. Each player calculates λ(z) = (λ
(z)
min + λ
(z)
max)/2;
3. With the unit-reward of energy contribution λ, each player
determines the optimal transmit covariance matrix Qi by
solving the local problem (24);
4. Each player calculates its energy contribution βi and broad-
casts this value to other players;
5. According to the bisection rule, each player updates the
unit-reward λ with all the values of {βi}. That is, if∑
i∈K βi < Γ, λ
(z+1)
min = λ
(z), otherwise λ
(z+1)
max = λ(z).
z = z + 1;
6. Go to Step 2 until λ converges, that is, λmax − λmin is
smaller than a threshold.
D. Multiple Energy Harvesters
When there are multiple RF energy harvesters in the vicinity
of the wireless communication transmitters, the transmission
algorithms need to be modified to satisfy the energy harvesting
requirement of each harvester. Suppose that the wireless
communication systems are aware of the multiple RF energy
harvesters. The transmitters deliberately concentrate the RF
radiations to charge this network of energy harvesters. Any RF
energy harvester can dynamically join and leave the energy
harvesting network. An energy harvester requests and joins
the network when its battery is depleted and needs a recharge.
An energy harvester leaves the network once it has enough
collected energy.
Suppose that L is the finite set of the L RF energy harvesters
that are actively considered by the wireless transmitters. If a
device’s battery is critically low, i.e., below a lower threshold,
the device registers onto the energy harvesting network. The
wireless communication systems consider its energy harvest-
ing requirement. If a device’s battery is sufficiently charged,
i.e., beyond an upper threshold, the device reports and leaves
the energy harvesting network. The wireless communication
systems remove this energy harvester from their transmission
consideration. Nevertheless, this device harvests RF energy
anyways without the consciousness of the wireless communi-
cation systems. Upon changes of Set L, i.e., any device joining
or leaving the RF energy harvesting network, the wireless
810
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Fig. 2. Achievable information rates of K = 3 wireless users over non-
cooperative game iterations. Channel Set I.
communication systems redesign their transmit covariance
matrices to satisfy the energy harvesting requirements.
With multiple RF energy harvesters, the last constraint of
Problem P4 is modified as∑
i∈K
gHliQigli ≥ Γl, ∀l ∈ L. (28)
The energy harvesting requirements are reflected in a set of
constraints, with Γl being the energy requirement of the lth
harvester. The ith transmitter knows the channel vector gli to
the lth energy harvester. The transmit covariance matrix Qi
needs to satisfy gHliQigli ≥ Γl −
∑
k∈K\{i} g
H
kiQkgki = Γli,
where Γli is the required energy contribution from the ith
transmitter to the lth RF energy harvester.
Because of the coupling constraints, we use a similar dual
decomposition to decompose the convex optimization problem
into two levels of subproblems. At the lower level, each
transmitter solves a local convex optimization problem as
maximize
Qi
log
∣∣∣I+ R˜−1i HiiQiHHii ∣∣∣
−
∑
j 6=i Tr
(
AjHjiQiH
H
ji
)
+
∑
l λlg
H
liQigli
subject to Qi  0
Tr(Qi) ≤ Pi
(29)
where λl is the dual variable associated with the energy
harvesting requirement of the lth RF energy harvester. At the
higher level, the master problem updates the dual variables
{λl} by solving the dual problem
minimize
{λl}
g({λl}) =
∑
i∈K gi({λl})−
∑
l∈L λlΓl
subject to λl ≥ 0, ∀l ∈ L
(30)
where gi({λl}) is the dual function obtained as the maximum
value of the Lagrangian solved in (29) for given {λl}. The
master dual problem of g({λl}) can be solved with a sub-
gradient method (see Appendix D). The decomposition method
solves the dual problem, and strong duality holds for the primal
problem and the dual problem.
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The dual variable λl can be interpreted as the unit-reward
for energy contribution to the lth energy harvester. In the
master dual problem, the multiple players bargain over the
unit-rewards for energy contribution to the energy harvesters.
The unit-rewards {λl} can be different for different energy
harvesters according to the channels {gli} and the energy re-
quirements {Γl}. This creates an incentive for the transmitters
to concentrate the RF energy to where it is needed the most.
Note that, as for future research consideration, the channels
{gli} from the wireless communication transmitters to the
RF energy harvesters may be fixed but unknown to the
transmitters. To establish a transmission game with RF energy
harvesting, the energy harvesters that are attached to IoT
devices can feed back their battery charging statuses through
the Internet. Suppose that the feedback delay is negligible.
Energy harvester l can measure its RF energy harvesting
rate (battery charging rate) ψl =
∑
i∈K g
H
liQigli and feed
back ψl to any of the transmitters. Also, the IoT device with
energy harvester l may simply feed back an indication whether
ψl ≥ Γl is satisfied.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We simulate a network of K = 3 wireless users, i.e., three
pairs of wireless transmitter and receiver. The transmissions
of the wireless users interfere with each other. Each user
adjusts its transmit covariance matrix Qi (i ∈ K) to maximize
the information rate. In the vicinity of the transmitters, there
is an RF energy harvester. The harvester requires a certain
amount of received RF energy collectively from the three
wireless transmitters. Each transmitter has Mt = 8 transmit
antennas and each receiver has Mr = 8 receive antennas,
hence 8 × 8 MIMO channels. The RF energy harvester has
one receive antenna. The user channel matrices Hii (i ∈ K),
the interference channel matrices Hij (i 6= j), and the channel
vectors toward the energy harvester gi (i ∈ K) are arbitrary
but do not vary over a long period of user transmission. We
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randomly select channel set {Hii,Hij ,gi} to simulate the
wireless channels for the transmission game. Each element
of the channels is independent circularly symmetric complex
Gaussian with zero mean and unit variance. The transmit
power constraints are set as Pi = 8 (∀i ∈ K) and the energy
harvesting requirement Γ is around the range [40, 90] so that
the optimization problem is feasible and the energy harvesting
constraint is effective.
When a non-cooperative game is played among the three
wireless transmitters, the transmitters start with independent
initial guesses on transmit covariance matrices and update
them sequentially. At its turn, transmitter i measures the in-
terference and noise Ri, acquires the partial minimum energy
requirement Γi, and solves the local optimization problem P2
with the multi-level water-filing solution. This solution is the
best response of user i to others’ transmission strategies that
maximizes the information rate unilaterally. With an arbitrary
Channel Set I, Fig. 2 shows the achievable information rates
of the three users over game iterations. Each iteration includes
a round of sequential responses of the three transmitters. As
Γ = 70, the game process converges to a pure NE. As Γ = 90,
the game process cycles around a pure NE. Fig. 3 shows the
achievable sum rate of the three users over game iterations,
where the energy harvesting requirement Γ ranges from 50
to 90. With a more demanding Γ, the achievable sum rate
suffers and the best-response dynamic may cycle around a pure
NE. With another arbitrary Channel Set II, Fig. 4 and Fig. 5
show the achievable information rates and the achievable sum
rate, respectively, of the three users over game iterations. The
energy harvesting requirement Γ ranges from 40 to 80. Similar
effects on the achievable rates are revealed.
With Channel Set I and Set II the same as above, a coop-
erative game is played among the three wireless transmitters
to maximize the sum utility. The individual utility is derived
from an approximation of the achievable information rate. A
distributed bargaining process is implemented in the network
to solve optimization problem P4. The three users bargain
sequentially over the energy contributions and finally agree
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on the unit-reward λ. With Channel Set I, Fig. 6 and Fig. 7
show the achievable information rates and the achievable sum
rate, respectively, of the three users over bargaining iterations.
The initial Q˜i is found as the solution of (20). With Channel
Set II, Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 show the achievable information rates
and the achievable sum rate, respectively, of the three users
over bargaining iterations. If Q˜i is close to the optimal Qi,
the approximation error of the utility function is negligible.
The bargaining process has better performance than the non-
cooperative game. This is the case with Channel Set I, as we
compare the corresponding sum rates in Fig. 7 and Fig. 3.
However, if Q˜i is far from the optimal Qi, the approximation
error can be relatively large. The bargaining result may be
inferior to the one in the non-cooperative game. This is the
case with Channel Set II, as we compare the corresponding
sum rates in Fig. 9 and Fig. 5.
To deal with the issue of utility approximation error, Q˜i is
updated with the previously derived optimal Qi, and the net-
work repeats the distributed bargaining process. With Channel
Set I, Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 show the achievable information
rates and the sum rate, respectively, of the three users in the
cooperative game over iterations of updating {Q˜i}. Each point
in the figures is a bargaining result. With Channel Set II,
Fig. 12 and Fig. 13 show the achievable information rates and
the sum rate, respectively, of the three users in the cooperative
game over iterations of updating {Q˜i}. As illustrated in Fig. 10
and Fig. 12, the user achievable information rates quickly
improve and approach the Pareto front. Comparing Fig. 11
with Fig. 3 and comparing Fig. 13 with Fig. 5, we notice
significant improvement in the achievable sum rates resulting
from the distributed implementation of the cooperative game.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have considered the multi-user transmis-
sion problem in MIMO interference channels with transmit
power constraints and energy-harvesting requirements. Under
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over bargaining iterations. Channel Set I.
mutual interference, each wireless user designs its transmit
covariance matrix to maximize the achievable information
rate. At the same time, the transmissions provide sufficient
energy for the RF energy harvesters. The problem is formu-
lated as a strategic game played by the multiple transmitters.
Measuring the interference from others, a transmitter has its
best response in the non-cooperative game that constructs
the transmit covariance matrix with the multi-level water-
filling solution. An algorithm for the multi-level water-filling
is derived. A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the non-
cooperative game exists. It may not be unique or Pareto-
efficient. To find the point of rates that approaches the Pareto
front, the users cooperate and bargain over the unit-reward of
energy contribution. The individual utility function is from an
approximation of the achievable information rate such that the
sum-rate optimization problem can be decomposed and the
bargaining process implemented distributively. To overcome
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the issue of large approximation error, the bargaining process
can repeat with reinitialization using the previously derived
optimal solution of the transmit covariance matrices. With
moderate signaling among the users, the cooperative game
process quickly reaches a point of rates that is close to the
Pareto front.
APPENDIX A
THE OPTIMAL SOLUTION OF PROBLEM P2
To find the optimal solution of Problem P2, we use the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [35] that are given as
(∀m)
qˆm ≥ 0
λm ≥ 0
qˆmλm = 0
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M∑
m=1
qˆm − P ≤ 0
Γ−
M∑
m=1
|gˆm|
2qˆm ≤ 0
ν1 ≥ 0
ν2 ≥ 0
ν1
(
M∑
i=1
qˆm − P
)
= 0
ν2
(
Γ−
M∑
m=1
|gˆm|
2qˆm
)
= 0
−
|σm|2
1 + |σm|2qˆm
− λm + ν1 − ν2|gˆm|
2 = 0
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As λm acts as a slack variable, it can be eliminated that leaves
qˆm ≥ 0
qˆm
(
ν1 − ν2|gˆm|
2 −
|σm|2
1 + |σm|2qˆm
)
= 0
ν1 − ν2|gˆm|
2 −
|σm|
2
1 + |σm|2qˆm
≥ 0
From these conditions, if follows that qˆm ≥ 1/(ν1−ν2|gˆm|2)−
1/|σm|2. Therefore, we have
qˆ∗m =


1/(ν1 − ν2|gˆm|2)− 1/|σm|2,
if 1/(ν1 − ν2|gˆm|2) > 1/|σm|2
0, if 1/(ν1 − ν2|gˆm|2) ≤ 1/|σm|2
(31)
where ν1 and ν2 are non-negative parameters that make {qˆ∗m}
satisfy the transmit power constraint and the energy harvesting
requirement. This is a water-filing solution with multiple water
12
levels. For 1/(ν1 − ν2|gˆm|2) > 1/|σm|2, the water level is
1/(ν1 − ν2|gˆm|
2) which depends on gˆm.
APPENDIX B
DISCUSSION ON THE ESTIMATION OF VECTOR CHANNEL
gi
As revealed in the optimization problem P2 and in the
multi-level water-filling solution (13), it is suffice to estimate
{|gˆim|2}
Mt
m=1 of the vector channel to the RF energy harvester.
The user channel Hii is estimated and the multi-user inter-
ference and noise Ri is measured. Therefore, the pre-coding
matrix Vi can be calculated.
We need a special arrangement for transmitter i to acquire
{|gˆim|2}
Mt
m=1. In this arrangement, only transmitter i transmits,
and it concentrates its transmit power P on the mth transmis-
sion direction represented by themth column of the pre-coding
matrix Vi. That is, the signal covariance matrix is chosen
as Qˆi = P · diag(0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−1
, 1, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mt−m
) and, accordingly, the
transmit covariance matrix is ViQˆiV
H
i . The received power
at the RF energy harvester is ζgˆHi Qˆigˆi = ζP |gˆim|
2. Because
the RF energy harvester is attached to an IoT device, this value
can be fed back to transmitter i through the Internet.
Transmitter i concentrates its transmit power P consecu-
tively on each of the Mt transmission directions according
to the columns of the pre-coding matrix Vi. Suppose that the
transmitter and the RF energy harvester IoT can be synced and
the feedback delay can be considered. The channel elements
{|gˆim|2}
Mt
m=1 can be estimated and be used in solving Problem
P2.
APPENDIX C
DERIVATION OF THE APPROXIMATION OF THE MAXIMUM
INFORMATION RATE
The maximum information rate is
ri = log
∣∣I+R−1i HiiQiHHii ∣∣ . (32)
Here, ri is a scalar function of matrix Ri. Therefore, dri can
be given by
dri = d log
∣∣I+R−1i HiiQiHHii ∣∣ (33)
= Tr
(
(I+R−1i HiiQiH
H
ii )
−1
d(I+R−1i HiiQiH
H
ii )
)
(34)
= Tr
(
(I+R−1i HiiQiH
H
ii )
−1(dR−1i )
HiiQiH
H
ii
)
(35)
= −Tr
(
(I+R−1i HiiQiH
H
ii )
−1R−1i (dRi)R
−1
i
HiiQiH
H
ii
)
(36)
= −Tr
(
R−1i HiiQiH
H
ii (I+R
−1
i HiiQiH
H
ii )
−1
R−1i dRi
)
(37)
= −Tr
(
(R−1i − (I+R
−1
i HiiQiH
H
ii )
−1
R−1i )dRi
)
(38)
= −Tr
(
(R−1i − (Ri +HiiQiH
H
ii )
−1)dRi
)
(39)
where, (34) follows the fact that d log |Z| = Tr(Z−1dZ), (35)
follows the fact that d(AZB) = A(dZ)B, and (36) follows
the fact that dZ−1 = −Z−1(dZ)Z−1. Here, Z is a complex-
valued matrix, andA and B are independent of Z and Z∗ [43].
The first-order Taylor expansion of the maximum informa-
tion rate ri around Ri = R˜i can be written as
ri ≈ ri|Ri=R˜i +Tr
(
∇Riri
∣∣∣∣
Ri=R˜i
· (Ri − R˜i)
)
(40)
= log
∣∣∣I+ R˜−1i HiiQiHHii ∣∣∣
−Tr
(
(R˜−1i − (R˜i +HiiQiH
H
ii )
−1)(Ri − R˜i)
)
(41)
Replacing R˜−1i − (R˜i+HiiQiH
H
ii )
−1 with its approximation
Ai = R˜
−1
i − (R˜i +HiiQ˜iH
H
ii )
−1, we have
ri ≈ log
∣∣∣I+ R˜−1i HiiQiHHii ∣∣∣− Tr(AiRi) + Tr(AiR˜i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
c
.
(42)
APPENDIX D
SUB-GRADIENT METHOD FOR THE MASTER DUAL
PROBLEM
The energy contribution of transmitter i to RF energy
harvester l (l ∈ L) is denoted as βli = g
H
liQigli. Let
bi = [β1i, β2i, . . . , βLi]
T . Let gi({λl}) be the dual function
obtained as the maximum value of the Lagrangian solved in
(29) for a given set of {λl}l∈L.
The sub-gradient for each gi({λl}) is given by
si({λl}) = bi(Q
∗
i ) (43)
where Q∗i is the optimal solution of (29) for given {λl}.
Transmitter i broadcasts bi(Q
∗
i ) to other players during each
iteration of the cooperative game. The global sub-gradient is
then given by
s({λl}) =
∑
i∈K
si({λl})− Γ =
∑
i∈K
bi(Q
∗
i )− Γ (44)
where Γ = [Γ1,Γ2, . . . ,ΓL]
T . The master dual problem can
be solved iteratively as
λ(z+1) = λ(z) − αzs(λ
(z)) (45)
where λ = [λ1, λ2, . . . , λL]
T and αz ≥ 0 is the step size.
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